Two pieces of news arrived in the same week, one small and one large, and they turn out to be the same story.
In Pisa, a court ordered Banca Etica to reopen the bank account of AI ODV, the association behind the Italian collective Autistici/Inventati. The bank will not appeal and will make the account work again. In Brussels, the final negotiations on the digital euro ran from around midday until past four in the morning and ended without a deal. One of the two questions left open was what happens to people in Europe who are hit by sanctions that the EU itself does not recognise.
Neither story is about money. Both are about the plumbing underneath it: who decides whether a person, an association or a court can pay and be paid.
Small change
In August the United States put Autistici/Inventati on its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Some time after that, Banca Etica blocked the association’s account. Now a court in Pisa has ordered it reopened.
The court’s reasoning sits in the decision itself, which the announcement links but does not summarise. A European court ordered a European bank to restore an account, and the bank chose not to argue further. On that reading, an American list did not by itself settle who may hold a bank account in Italy.
It is a good outcome, and a narrow one. It came after the damage was done, for one association, and only because that association had the stamina to go to court. Most people closed out of a bank have neither the lawyers nor the patience.
Too difficult with the Americans
Money in a bank account is, strictly speaking, a promise from that bank. Cash is something else: public money, issued by the central bank. The digital euro would be the second kind in electronic form, issued by the European Central Bank on its own infrastructure, separate from the existing payment systems, with an offline version for small payments when power and internet are down.
It went from long-running project to near-certainty because of dependence. Thirteen of the twenty euro-area countries rely on Visa and Mastercard for card payments and have no national alternative left. The Netherlands is one of them. Both companies are bound by American sanctions, so Washington can make payments impossible for an institution that is not in the United States at all.
The International Criminal Court in The Hague is the current example. Nine of its eighteen judges are already on an American sanctions list, which means trouble making payments and no access to American online services. The US government has announced that the whole court goes on the list on 7 April 2027. Its house bank, ABN Amro, has a large American branch and, by NRC’s account, cannot afford a conflict with the United States.
The European Parliament, through an amendment from a Volt member and with the whole Parliament behind it, wants the digital euro to stay open to people in Europe who fall under such sanctions and lose access to their bank accounts. ICC judges, for instance. That clause is where the talks snagged.
Some member states fear provoking Washington. Diplomats, according to MEP Dirk Gotink, say it is simply too difficult with the Americans at the moment. The Commission went further. According to a source in the room, it fears Europe cannot build its own digital currency without American technology at all, since people would reach the digital euro through apps on phones that mostly run on American software. Its answer, says Green negotiator Damian Boeselager, is to weaken the right of universal access instead. That right already exists: under the EU’s payment accounts directive, anyone legally resident in the EU may open a payment account, whatever their financial situation or address.
The next round is in December.
By kind permission
A third signal came on the Wednesday of the same week. Codeberg, the German non-profit where many European projects went to get away from GitHub, disappeared from the internet when its American registrar, NameSilo, suspended codeberg.org. The domain had not expired and had not been transferred. It had vanished from the account and been put on hold, and the case was sitting with the registrar’s abuse team. No sanctions list was involved, no court, no stated reason. The site itself was still running. Nobody could find it.
Europe cannot protect people who build their own infrastructure once that infrastructure serves someone a great power dislikes. The United States is the current case. Any power holding a layer of the stack could play the same part. A collective offering email to activists, a court trying war crimes, a forge hosting free software: each turned out to rest on something held elsewhere, and each could be switched off from there without any European institution being asked.
The protection that does exist is narrow. A report by Pieter Omtzigt for the European Stability Initiative proposes giving the ICC an account directly at De Nederlandsche Bank or the ECB. That is a workaround for an institution with states behind it. Nobody is going to open a central bank account for a nurse whose bank has read a list, or for a small association whose registrar has gone quiet. Codeberg had a second domain, codeberg.eu, and still could not move to it in a matter of hours.
The digital euro was the one version of that central bank account open to everyone: public money, held directly, with the state as provider of last resort. The Commission’s position in the trilogue is that it cannot be made to work without American technology, so the access guarantee is the part to weaken. The escape is planned to run on the thing being escaped, and the people most likely to need it are the ones to be left out of it.
The layers stack. The cards run on American networks, the replacement would run on apps, the apps on phones whose operating systems and app stores are American. Codeberg left GitHub and still kept its name with an American registrar. Each step out lands on the next dependency, and each can be offered as a reason not to start.
On this week’s evidence, European sovereignty over its own infrastructure does not exist. What exists is tolerance: people and institutions in Europe run their affairs on layers others hold, and carry on for as long as the holders allow. Pisa and Brussels show the same reflex at two scales. In Pisa the law arrived after the intermediary had already acted. In Brussels the law is still being written, and the foreign list is shaping it before anyone has asked it to.
Someone else’s problem
It is tempting to feel grateful to the current American administration for making all this visible. Objections to the digital euro in the European Parliament evaporated once the second Trump administration took office, as unease about Europe’s digital dependence grew.
The dependencies were not exactly silent before, though. They were mostly heard at the edges. In 2010 Visa, Mastercard, PayPal and others cut off WikiLeaks in a financial blockade driven by informal government pressure rather than any criminal charge. In 2019 European governments set up INSTEX, a channel meant to let companies trade with Iran without falling foul of American sanctions. The governments involved blamed Iranian obstruction. Europe’s purpose-built route around a foreign list never carried real traffic. The EU also has a blocking statute, an instrument for voiding foreign sanctions inside the Union, and Gotink is now trying to persuade the Commission to activate it.
What changed is less visibility than proximity. When the list reaches a whistleblowing site or an Iranian importer, it can be filed as someone else’s problem. When it reaches judges at a court in The Hague, hosted by one member state and funded by many, and an association with a bank account in Pisa, the habit of looking away gets harder to keep up.
Unless
Unless rights attach to people rather than to providers. The payment accounts directive already gives everyone legally resident in the EU the right to a payment account, but that right only holds while some bank is willing to provide one. The Parliament’s clause in the digital euro talks would make public money the account of last resort. That is the only version of the ICC’s central bank solution a nurse, a pensioner or a small association could ever use.
Unless the blocking statute is used. It exists to make foreign sanctions void inside the Union. Activated, and backed by support for the companies punished for obeying it, it would turn “too difficult with the Americans” from an excuse into a cost Europe has decided to bear.
Unless every layer is held, not only the visible one: names, registrars, app stores, phone platforms, card rails, cloud. A European currency on American operating systems, or a European forge on an American registrar, is a European front door in someone else’s wall.
Unless the price is accepted. Protecting people who lean against a great power means being willing to take the retaliation that follows. Sovereignty that is only available when it costs nothing is not sovereignty, and the night in Brussels suggests that, for now, the price still looks too high to the people at the table.
Until then, sovereignty in Europe means window dressing.
Further
- Taking back the stack, on mapping dependencies in a single stack (under construction)
- Dependencies, on what could happen in Europe if each one collapses (under construction)