On 1 September 2026 Banca Popolare Etica suspended the account of the association behind Autistici/Inventati, and explained itself in public. The bank had contacted the Italian banking association, ABI, the association of cooperative banks, Assopopolari, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and was acting, its statement says, in the absence of any ruling or guidance from Italian and European institutions.

On the website of the UIF, the financial intelligence unit housed in the Banca d’Italia, a page on countering the financing of terrorism says that lists drawn up by other bodies, the Office of Foreign Assets Control among them, are published there only to help assess whether a transaction is suspicious, and that being named on such a list does not in itself create any obligation to freeze funds.

The page was last modified on 29 September 2026, but the substance is older. In November 2025, ten months before the designation, the same page already said that the UIF circulates the OFAC list to support possible reports, but that no obligation to freeze funds attaches to it. The wording has since become firmer, from supporting reports to solely helping assess them, and from no obligation to not in itself an obligation.

The old wording was still there on 24 August 2026, two days before the designation. Somewhere in the five weeks that contain the designation, the bank’s statement and the collective’s closure, the page was rewritten, with no explanation on it. (Vetinari: Clerks do not, as a rule, improve a sentence for the pleasure of it.)

Rule by list followed what a designation does. A signature in Washington is followed by private intermediaries, each deciding alone that a customer is not worth the risk. It concluded that over-compliance does most of a designation’s work. It left aside what a bank sets against that risk. A compliance department weighs the cost of keeping a listed customer against the backing on offer for keeping it. The designation sets the cost. Governments set the backing, and for the most part they set it by doing nothing.

Three places could have offered it. Rome was where the collective lived, the International Criminal Court sits in The Hague, and Brussels has had a digital sovereignty agenda for a decade and a blocking statute for three. Over the same weeks the United States moved against both the collective and the Court, and each of the three treated the two cases differently.

Two lists, one month, no hearing

The collective was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on 26 August 2026. Within a fortnight its domain was on hold at the .org registry, PayPal had closed its donation account, the bank had suspended and then closed its account, and on 6 September it announced it would shut down. Services ended on 18 September. An urgent application against the bank has been pending at the Court of Pisa since 8 September. The collective’s lawyer expected a hearing to be fixed quickly, though probably not before 25 September, when the American licence ran out. No order has been published.

The Court’s turn came in instalments. On 18 August the United States designated its President, Judge Tomoko Akane, and a senior trial lawyer, Abdoulaye Seye, bringing the count, by the Court’s own reckoning, to nine of its eighteen judges, both deputy prosecutors, the former prosecutor and one staff member. The wind-down licence for the two new names expired on 17 September. Around 20 September the Wall Street Journal and Reuters reported that sanctions against the Court as a whole had been prepared. On 22 September the American President used the General Assembly to call on states to leave the Court; by the end of that week one small state had said it would.

The collective sits under Executive Order 13224, the counter-terrorism order; the Court’s officials under the order written for the Court. Both orders work the same way. Nothing happens to anyone in Washington. Banks, registries, payment processors, software vendors and insurers with any American exposure read a list and decide.

The Hague: hands off, whose hands

The Netherlands has spoken about the Court more, and more often, than any other government in this account. The Prime Minister, Rob Jetten, told the General Assembly on 24 September to keep hands off the ICC and off the other institutions that protect the international legal order. The speech describes attempts to undermine the Court. It does not name the United States or its President.

The Foreign Minister, Tom Berendsen, was less coy in front of a microphone. On 19 August he told NOS that the Netherlands of course disapproved of the sanctions, that he had raised them in person with his American counterpart, Rubio, a few weeks earlier, and that this had unfortunately not yet been effective. He called the language Washington uses about the Court very fierce, and declined to answer in kind. The task, as he put it, was to disapprove diplomatically while doing everything to let the Court keep working. According to the Rights Forum, the written statement of the same day did not say who had imposed the sanctions, and a ministry spokesperson pointed to confidential diplomacy.

A letter to the House of Representatives of 1 December 2025 names the United States, commits the cabinet to engaging Dutch business against over-compliance, offers the Court knowledge and expertise for its digital independence rather than services, and promises to push for activating the EU blocking statute if new American sanctions were to seriously impede the Court’s functioning. (Vetinari: One names names in private, where it is useful, and never from a podium, where it would merely be true.)

The House has asked for more than the cabinet has givwn. A motion in October 2025 asked the cabinet to work in the EU for applying the blocking statute and to defend the Court publicly, and was adopted with a broad majority. A second, in April 2026, repeated the request and passed 79 to 71.

In New York on 22 September, hours after the American President’s speech, the minister told the Volkskrant that the Netherlands had asked the Commission to have the statute ready, so that this paardenmiddel, a horse remedy, a cure drastic enough to be feared in its own right, could be used, and that the Netherlands was prepared to use it. In the same interview he called it a last resort. As long as the Court can be protected in other ways, it will be, because a remedy of that kind is not for sending a signal and could make the matter escalate further.

At a committee debate on 30 September the instrument stayed, in the reported phrase, ready for use once the Court is paralysed; PRO, D66, SP and DENK wanted it now, VVD, CDA, ChristenUnie and PVV wanted to wait, and the cabinet undertook to keep the House informed, confidentially if necessary, about further sanctions.

A last resort deters only while it might be used. Each day the statute stays unused shows Washington more of what it can do without triggering it. Waiting until the Court is paralysed tells Washington that anything short of paralysis is safe. (Vetinari: The difficulty with a last resort is that everybody else can count how many resorts come first.)

Meanwhile the Court has not waitrd. It replaced its Microsoft workplace with openDesk, changed insurers and financial providers to firms without an American footprint, and is reported to be paying staff months in advance. The host state’s banks, asked about their policy on the American sanctions list, declined to answer, all five of them, citing client confidentiality.

On the collective, the Dutch government has said nothing at all. No public statement from Foreign Affairs, Justice, Economic Affairs, Finance or the central bank has been found. On 10 September two members, Barbara Kathmann (PRO) and Sarah El Boujdaini (D66), tabled fifteen written questions on the consequences of American sanctions for the European internet sector, asking for answers before the debate of 30 September. On 28 September the Foreign Minister postponed the answer, citing the need for coordination between ministries. The eighth question asks whether the cabinet condemns the United States for putting internet providers on a terrorism list for political reasons. It has not been answered.

Two days before the questions were tabled, Arda Gerkens, who chairs the ATKM, the Dutch authority for terrorist and child sexual abuse material online, told NRC that her authority takes the EU sanctions list as its main yardstick and does not treat the American list as a criterion; any country can call an organisation terrorist, and her authority may see it very differently. Gerkens spoke about removing online content. No minister has said the same about bank accounts.

Rome: filed under unsaid

Italy is where the collective was registered, where its bank was, where its money still is, and where its case is being heard. No statement on the designation has been found from the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Interior Minister, the Justice Minister, the Farnesina or Palazzo Chigi. Asked at the end of September, the innovation department at Palazzo Chigi declined to comment. Marco Cappato, who is not in government, asked on Euronews how it can be that Italy, as a government, has nothing to say to its American allies about the matter.

On 2 September two politicians from Fratelli d’Italia, the Prime Minister’s party, the MEP Carlo Fidanza and the deputy Augusta Montaruli, deposited an esposto asking the prosecutors in Pisa to establish whether offences had been committed, aiding and abetting among them, and to look at individual members. Nobody asked the prosecutor to check the listing itself. Montaruli, with her party colleague Donzelli, also tabled an interpellanza on the designation and its effects in Italy; no answer has been found. In Brussels Fidanza and twenty other ECR members filed a priority question on 1 September, about a Commission official who in 2018 had co-founded the association that runs the collective. Six weeks before the designation, an under-secretary at the Interior Ministry had represented Italy at the American Secretary of State’s ministerial on far-left terrorism, reportedly to follow how the United States designates groups.

The MEP Brando Benifei announced a question to the Commission within two days of the designation, saying the measure struck a service intermediary indiscriminately and tied it without proof to possible illicit uses by third parties; the deputy Andrea Casu asked how American sanctions had come to have direct effects on digital services in Italy. In the Senate, PD senators tabled a written question, published on 14 September; in the Camera, AVS deputies tabled a second interpellanza, published the same day. No answer to either has been found.

The UIF page gives general guidance and has said much the same since at least November 2025. But it answers, in advance and in the state’s own voice, the legal question underneath the bank’s request to the state: does an OFAC listing oblige an Italian bank to freeze? The bank’s own president and counsel said at a webinar on 9 September that there was no automatism and no obligation. The collective’s lawyer argues the same at Pisa. The bank’s director general, Nazzareno Gabrielli, told L’Indipendente that the funds remain the association’s property but stay blocked, because moving them without a specific OFAC authorisation, which the sanctioned party could apply for, would expose the bank to secondary sanctions.

Everyone on the record agreed that no Italian rule required the freeze. What was missing was backing that a bank of 130,000 customers and members could point to when asked why it had kept one customer that Washington disliked. The bank asked for that. ABI and Assopopolari, Gabrielli said, took up the request and assured the bank of their commitment. From the institutions themselves, which the bank had been writing to since September 2025, it had so far received no answers. A ruling from Pisa may yet supply it. A press release would have repeated what the UIF page already said. What the bank asked for in the letter it co-signed on 1 October was binding rules.

On 11 June, eleven weeks before the listing, the Court of Justice held, in Jenec, that a name on the OFAC list does not on its own justify refusing to open a payment account with basic features; the bank has to assess the customer itself, with the listing as one factor among others. The judgment rests on the Payment Accounts Directive, which protects consumers, natural persons acting outside their trade, and Gabrielli pointed out to L’Indipendente that an association is not one, and that the ruling does nothing against secondary sanctions. When two Five Star MEPs, Danilo Della Valle and Dario Tamburrano, wrote to the Commission on 10 September, they cited the judgment by date and argued that the freeze ran counter to it. (Vetinari: The law had been perfectly clear. It had simply been clear about somebody else.)

Rome has said nothing about the Court either, though without the hostility. Italy did not sign the joint statement of support in February 2025, having signed a similar one in June 2024, and did not explain why. It has since been referred to the Assembly of States Parties over its handling of the Almasri warrant, which gives the government a dispute of its own with the Court. No government reaction to the August designations has been found. The Foreign Minister’s General Assembly speech two days after the American President’s chose, in its own phrase, “the strength of law” against “the law of the strongest”, and did not mention the Court.

Brussels: the toolbox, unopened

EU leaders have so far defended the Court only in words. Kaja Kallas, the High Representative, issued a statement on 19 August regretting the designations and promising full support for the protection of the Court and its staff. In New York on 21 September she said the Union had tools in its toolbox for when it gets really serious, and did not say which tools, or what really serious would look like. António Costa told the General Assembly that threats and attacks against the Court were unacceptable. On 19 August he and Ursula von der Leyen had posted on X, in near-identical words, that they stand firmly with the Court and its President, and that its judges and officials must be able to act without external pressure. Where the pressure came from, the posts did not say.

The tool everybody means is the blocking statute, Council Regulation 2271/96, which forbids EU operators to comply with foreign sanctions listed in its annex and can be extended to new ones by a Commission delegated act. Spain wrote to the Commission President in May asking for exactly that, covering the Court’s judges and prosecutors and the UN rapporteur Francesca Albanese, and planned to raise it at the June European Council. The conclusions of that Council do not mention the Court. On 29 September a Commission spokesperson said that diplomatic efforts remain the preferred option and that the Commission was in constant discussion with the member states about the statute. The Commission’s own page on the statute records no activity after 2021. In February the Commission had answered a parliamentary question by listing a delegated act amending the statute among the measures under consideration, next to a preference for diplomatic outreach and targeted solutions. Eight months on, the Commission is still considering the act and still prefers diplomacy.

The statute protects EU companies, such as the banks and vendors that serve the Court. The Court itself is an international organisation, and commentators doubt the statute would protect it. They may be right. Meanwhile the banks and vendors go unprotected.

On the collective, the Commission President, the High Representative, the Council, the Commissioner responsible for technological sovereignty and the European Data Protection Supervisor have all said nothing. Benifei’s priority question, dated 7 September and co-signed by twenty-eight colleagues, asked whether the Commission had independently checked the American accusations and how it would protect the Union’s regulatory autonomy.

Della Valle and Tamburrano, who sit with The Left group, filed a written question, on 10 September, and on 24 September Benedetta Scuderi and Ilaria Salis a third, on protection against third-country financial sanctions, on whether digital services lawfully run in the Union remain governed by Union law, and on American classifications of antifascism as terrorism. At the start of October none of the three had an answer, and neither had the question about the official.

A spokesperson for the Commission’s communications directorate said the case of its official was being examined and reminded staff of the rules on outside activities. The Union’s first public words connected with the case were a conflict-of-interest review prompted by Fratelli d’Italia MEPs.

Article 8 of the Digital Services Act forbids general monitoring obligations for intermediaries. The American theory of the case, as Rule by list set out, reads the anonymity and encryption a provider offers as features built to support operations. EDRi said on 3 September that the designation attacked the Union’s intermediary liability regime directly, and asked for the blocking statute to be extended to non-profits and intermediaries. No institution repeated it; inside Parliament it surfaced only as a footnote to Benifei’s question, citing the hosting liability rule of Article 6.

Every discussion of the blocking statute found among institutions and member states concerns the Court, sometimes with Albanese added. The collective does not appear in any of them. The statute’s annex does not cover Executive Order 13224, as Verfassungsblog noted, so even an activation for the Court would leave the collective’s case where it is. On 28 September, in Dublin, two MEPs, Aurore Lalucq and Dirk Gotink, called the protection of the Court a major test for Europe and set it against Europe’s dependence on American financial and cloud services. The collective, whose loss of a bank account a month earlier was the clearest case of that dependence, was not mentioned.

A mosquito on the wall

The fifth of the Dutch parliamentary questions reads, in translation: how does the cabinet respond to the situation of ProcoliX, a company that, as a result of the American intervention against the Italian A/I, no longer takes on work from the International Criminal Court? The question rests on an NRC report of 8 September on fear of American sanctions in the European internet sector. The company’s director, Koen de Jonge, said he wanted to help the Court, but had told it that ProcoliX could not go on working for it like this, being too vulnerable, and was withdrawing from a project to do more for it.

A subheading in the same article read “European authorities are silent”. Ruud Alaerds, director of the Dutch Cloud Community, an association of Dutch internet companies, told NRC that the quiet was notable, just as it had been around the American attacks on the Court, and gave his diagnosis in four words: “We willen geen ruzie.” Nobody wants a fight.

A Dutch hosting company read the American action against an Italian collective that nobody defended, recalculated its own exposure, and stepped back from further work for a court that its own government is defending at the General Assembly. The Netherlands will act once the Court is paralysed. ProcoliX withdrew before the Court itself was sanctioned, because the collective’s case showed it what happens to the suppliers of a sanctioned organisation.

A government can choose to protect a court of 125 states parties and leave a volunteer collective alone. The intermediaries serve both, read the same lists, and price the same risk. A company that watched Rome, The Hague and Brussels say nothing while an association legal in Italy lost its bank account learned something about what backing would be on offer if it kept serving the Court.

A short grammar of saying nothing

There is absolute silence, with no word at all, from any government or EU institution, on the collective’s designation.

There is speech without a subject. The Court is supported, threats are deplored, attempts to undermine it are condemned, and the party doing the threatening is left unnamed. That was The Hague at the podium and much of Brussels. Naming has a cost and anonymity has none, so the unnamed version costs the speaker nothing and offers the listener nothing to point to. (Vetinari: Naming is an act. Deploring is merely weather.)

There is speech without an instrument, such as the toolbox unopened, the horse remedy prepared, the statute under examination with the member states. That was Brussels throughout and The Hague since September. It differs from silence in that it is audible, and resembles it in that nothing changes for the compliance officer at the end of the chain.

There is silence about part of an answer already given, in the UIF sentence and the Digital Services Act’s ban on general monitoring. In both, the state or the Union had already written down part of what the bank and the provider needed to hear, and nobody in office has repeated it in public.

Finally, every move on the collective by governments, governing parties or EU institutions treated it as a suspect. A complaint to a prosecutor, an interpellanza in the Camera, a conflict-of-interest review in Brussels.

Protection, where it appeared, went to the target with international standing. A court with 125 states parties and a building in The Hague received statements from heads of government, a prepared instrument and a ministerial visit from Germany’s foreign minister. A volunteer collective with no spokesperson and no leaders received questions from opposition members and a complaint from Fratelli d’Italia politicians. The Americans, de Jonge told NRC, are testing the temperature of the water, watching how Italy, the banks and the Commission react, and he sees that they do not.

People without podiums

In the Netherlands, PublicSpaces sent a letter to the House and the cabinet on 17 September, co-signed by thirty-seven organisations including ISOC NL, Bits of Freedom, Freedom Internet and Waag Futurelab, with five demands; the fifth was to secure digital and financial services for the Court. ISOC NL said it would look into the decision of the .org registry, which ISOC itself founded. On 1 October the House’s committee on digital affairs asked the cabinet to respond to the letter. No deadline was set.

In Italy, on the same day, fifteen organisations, Banca Etica among them alongside ACLI, ARCI, Legacoop, Oxfam and the European federation of ethical banks, wrote to the Commission and the Italian government asking for help for those sanctioned, diplomatic action, use of the anti-coercion instrument, a rapid reform of the blocking regulation and its annex, and independent European digital and financial infrastructure. Their letter names the Court’s judges, Albanese and the collective together, which none of the institutions they wrote to has done.

The bank that closed the account is a signatory. It closed the account for fear of American secondary sanctions, then asked governments in public to protect banks in its position. (Vetinari: Few things are as eloquent as an institution asking, in public, to be ordered to do what it would rather have done.)

The Court left Microsoft and moved its insurance. At least one independent practice took the list as a threat event and redrew its own stack against it, and published the exercise as Taking back the stack. The December 2025 letter offered the Court knowledge and expertise for its digital independence. By then the Court had already chosen its software.

If Vetinari were in charge

Lord Vetinari, handed the eurozone’s governments and the Commission for a week, would issue no statement. Statements, in his experience, are what one issues having decided to do nothing else. He would issue instruments, most of which already exist, and he would start with the cheapest.

He would put the orders in the annex. The blocking statute bites only on the laws specified in its annex, and the Commission may add to that annex by delegated act. The order written for the Court would go in first. The collective’s order is harder. Executive Order 13224 also covers groups the Union itself sanctions, and the annex can only block a law as a whole. He would amend the regulation so that it can block single listings.

He would pay the bill in advance. Article 6 of the same regulation already lets an EU operator recover its damages from whoever caused them. He would add a fund, so that a bank keeping a customer who is lawful in the Union is compensated by its own side, promptly, instead of by the other side, eventually. (Vetinari: Courage is much more common in banks that have been told who is paying for it.)

He would read the anti-coercion regulation aloud, to the people who wrote it. It covers measures a third country applies “in order to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a particular act by the Union or a Member State”, and he would read sanctions on a court, followed by a call to leave it, as exactly that. The regulation describes itself as a last resort. He has already said what he thinks of last resorts.

He would widen the principle in Jenec. The right to a basic account, with a foreign listing as one factor among others, protects consumers. An amendment to the Payment Accounts Directive could extend it to associations, so that the law is clear about everybody.

He would make a cut-off from American payments cost less. Gabrielli named the means himself, payment circuits and card networks of the Union’s own, the digital euro among them, so that what a bank stands to lose if Washington cuts it off is smaller than what it loses by abandoning a lawful customer.

He would expect to be tested, and soon. The Union has been here before. In 2018 the Commission added the renewed American sanctions on Iran to the annex, and the Parliament’s research service reports the expert verdict that the statute proved ineffective, and INSTEX, the payment channel European states set up beside it, was never widely used. The first European bank punished for keeping a lawful customer would settle whether any of this was real, so the fund would pay before the bank’s lawyers had finished reading the letter. A fund that existed only on paper would be tested at once, and fail in public.

Only then, with all of these instruments in place and working, would he say something. With the instruments in place, a statement would cost nothing and, for once, mean something.


Update, 26 October 2026: on 9 October the United States sanctioned the Court itself. Six months’ grace follows what happened next.